| Part I (2)(a) | No known exploitable vulnerabilities at release | About a dozen dependencies, each pinned to one version. Sanitizers, compile-fail tests and fault-injection tests in the test suite. Vulnerabilities in Groundplane handled under a published policy. | In part | In part |
| Part I (2)(b) | Secure by default, with a reset to the original state | No unsigned or single-signature mode exists to switch on by mistake. Factory reset that wipes settings and user data: planned. | In part | In part |
| Part I (2)(c) | Vulnerabilities can be fixed with security updates | The device side: signed update, trial boot and automatic rollback. Delivering the update and notifying users stays with your system. | Works today | Works today |
| Part I (2)(d) | Protection from unauthorised access | Signatures checked on every boot and every update. Locked bootloader: planned. STM32U5: readout and write protection, boot lock, OEM keys and TrustZone isolation. STM32C5: readout and write protection, boot lock, OEM keys and hide protection. The STM32C5 has no TrustZone. | In part | In part |
| Part I (2)(e) | Confidentiality of stored and transmitted data | Firmware image encryption with the microcontroller's AES hardware: planned. Your risk assessment decides whether you need it, and has to say why if you don't. | Planned | Planned |
| Part I (2)(f) | Integrity of programs and configuration, and reporting corruption | Every image signed with ECDSA P-256 and ML-DSA-65; both are checked on every boot. An update package is checked before any flash is erased. Settings carry a CRC and a generation, and corruption is counted. | Works today | Works today |
| Part I (2)(h) | Essential functions stay available, also after an incident | A new image gets up to three counted trial boots with the watchdog running, then the device reverts to the previous one. Recovery over UART when nothing can boot. | Works today | Works today |
| Part I (2)(j) | Limited attack surface | A 45 KB bootloader without an RTOS. Fuzzing the USB update protocol and restricting it to a fixed schema: planned. | In part | In part |
| Part I (2)(k) | Exploitation mitigation | Memory protection unit set up at startup, stack limits, traps on unaligned access and division by zero, signing hardened against fault attacks. STM32U5: TrustZone isolation, planned. STM32C5: no TrustZone; memory protection unit only. | In part | In part |
| Part I (2)(l) | Record and monitor internal activity | Crash reports with a backtrace that survive the watchdog reset, counters for rejected and reverted updates, a record of every boot decision. A security event log with an opt-out: planned. | In part | In part |
| Part I (2)(m) | Remove all data and settings | Factory reset: planned. | Planned | Planned |
| Part II (1) | A software bill of materials | Generated by the build, in CycloneDX: planned. The dependency list is short enough to read in a minute. | Planned | Planned |
| Part II (2), (8) | Fix vulnerabilities without delay; security updates free of charge | Fixes ship in the latest release, free for every licensee until the published end date of their release line. A security counter separate from the version number, so a security fix doesn't force new features on you. | Works today | Works today |
| Part II (3) | Effective and regular security testing | Hundreds of automated tests on the host, in emulation and on the board, including fault injection on the bootloader. The tests ship with the source and run on your board. | Works today | Works today |
| Part II (4)–(6) | Disclosure policy, contact address, published advisories | For Groundplane itself: security page, security.txt and an advisory list. | Works today | Works today |
| Part II (7) | Secure distribution of updates | Images are signed in the build. A key-handling procedure for your production keys, and key revocation in OTP memory: planned. | In part | In part |