EU Cyber Resilience Act

The Cyber Resilience Act for microcontroller firmware

Since 11 September 2026 you have to report actively exploited vulnerabilities in your products within 24 hours. From 11 December 2027 every product with digital elements you place on the EU market has to meet Annex I. This page is for teams building industrial products on Cortex-M microcontrollers.

The dates

Four deadlines in fifteen months

Products that ship in December 2027 are being designed now. These are the dates that apply to a product with firmware, sold in the EU:

  1. CRA reporting Actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents, within 24 hours (Article 14)
  2. Product Liability Directive Software and firmware count as products, for products placed on the market after this date
  3. Machinery Regulation Protection against corruption, including of software, for machinery
  4. CRA in full Annex I requirements, conformity assessment and CE marking for every product placed on the EU market

Who does what

What lives in firmware, and what doesn't

Most of the CRA is process. Some of it can only be done in the firmware, and that part is hard to add late, because it starts at the first instruction the device runs.

Firmware can implement

  • Integrity of code and configuration, checked on every boot
  • Signed updates with protection against rollback to an older, vulnerable version
  • Recovery when an update fails
  • A record of what happened on the device
  • A small attack surface

Process you have to run

  • The cybersecurity risk assessment
  • A software bill of materials (SBOM)
  • Vulnerability handling and a disclosure policy
  • Reporting to the CSIRT and ENISA
  • A declared support period
  • The technical file and the declaration of conformity

Your system and backend

  • Delivering updates to the device
  • Telling users an update is available
  • Automatic updates with an opt-out
  • Collecting only the data you need

Annex I, clause by clause

What Groundplane covers, per microcontroller

Annex I lists the essential requirements. This table shows each one that touches firmware, what Groundplane does for it, and the status on each supported microcontroller. "In part" means some of it works today and the rest is on the roadmap. Whether a clause applies to your product is decided by your risk assessment.

  • Works today
  • In part
  • Planned before 1 Nov 2027
Annex IWhat it asksWhat Groundplane providesSTM32U5STM32C5
Part I (2)(a)No known exploitable vulnerabilities at releaseAbout a dozen dependencies, each pinned to one version. Sanitizers, compile-fail tests and fault-injection tests in the test suite. Vulnerabilities in Groundplane handled under a published policy.In partIn part
Part I (2)(b)Secure by default, with a reset to the original stateNo unsigned or single-signature mode exists to switch on by mistake. Factory reset that wipes settings and user data: planned.In partIn part
Part I (2)(c)Vulnerabilities can be fixed with security updatesThe device side: signed update, trial boot and automatic rollback. Delivering the update and notifying users stays with your system.Works todayWorks today
Part I (2)(d)Protection from unauthorised access Signatures checked on every boot and every update. Locked bootloader: planned. STM32U5: readout and write protection, boot lock, OEM keys and TrustZone isolation. STM32C5: readout and write protection, boot lock, OEM keys and hide protection. The STM32C5 has no TrustZone.In partIn part
Part I (2)(e)Confidentiality of stored and transmitted dataFirmware image encryption with the microcontroller's AES hardware: planned. Your risk assessment decides whether you need it, and has to say why if you don't.PlannedPlanned
Part I (2)(f)Integrity of programs and configuration, and reporting corruptionEvery image signed with ECDSA P-256 and ML-DSA-65; both are checked on every boot. An update package is checked before any flash is erased. Settings carry a CRC and a generation, and corruption is counted.Works todayWorks today
Part I (2)(h)Essential functions stay available, also after an incidentA new image gets up to three counted trial boots with the watchdog running, then the device reverts to the previous one. Recovery over UART when nothing can boot.Works todayWorks today
Part I (2)(j)Limited attack surfaceA 45 KB bootloader without an RTOS. Fuzzing the USB update protocol and restricting it to a fixed schema: planned.In partIn part
Part I (2)(k)Exploitation mitigation Memory protection unit set up at startup, stack limits, traps on unaligned access and division by zero, signing hardened against fault attacks. STM32U5: TrustZone isolation, planned. STM32C5: no TrustZone; memory protection unit only.In partIn part
Part I (2)(l)Record and monitor internal activityCrash reports with a backtrace that survive the watchdog reset, counters for rejected and reverted updates, a record of every boot decision. A security event log with an opt-out: planned.In partIn part
Part I (2)(m)Remove all data and settingsFactory reset: planned.PlannedPlanned
Part II (1)A software bill of materialsGenerated by the build, in CycloneDX: planned. The dependency list is short enough to read in a minute.PlannedPlanned
Part II (2), (8)Fix vulnerabilities without delay; security updates free of chargeFixes ship in the latest release, free for every licensee until the published end date of their release line. A security counter separate from the version number, so a security fix doesn't force new features on you.Works todayWorks today
Part II (3)Effective and regular security testingHundreds of automated tests on the host, in emulation and on the board, including fault injection on the bootloader. The tests ship with the source and run on your board.Works todayWorks today
Part II (4)–(6)Disclosure policy, contact address, published advisoriesFor Groundplane itself: security page, security.txt and an advisory list.Works todayWorks today
Part II (7)Secure distribution of updatesImages are signed in the build. A key-handling procedure for your production keys, and key revocation in OTP memory: planned.In partIn part

Points (g) and (i), data minimisation and impact on other networks, depend on what your product does and stay with you. Status as of 1 November 2026.

Readiness, not a stamp

I won't tell you you're compliant

Nobody can make your product compliant for you. You are the manufacturer of your product: the risk assessment, the technical file and the declaration of conformity are yours.

What I can do is implement the clauses above in the firmware, show you the tests that prove it, and give you the evidence for your file. That moves work off your schedule. It doesn't move any obligation off your books.

Groundplane is covered by the CRA too

A bootloader is a "boot manager", an important product in class I of Annex III. Volt Software is Groundplane's manufacturer, with its own vulnerability handling, a declared support period and, by 1 November 2027, a submission for class I conformity assessment.

Next step

Two ways to start

Groundplane pilot

EUR 14,000, licence included

Three months on an STM32U5 or STM32C5, with written success criteria and the product-line licence when it succeeds. For the first five customers; the list price is EUR 20,000.

How the pilot works

A call

Thirty minutes, no slides

Tell me what your product is and when it ships. I'll tell you whether Groundplane fits, and if it doesn't, I'll say so.

Get in touch

Sources

This page is an engineering reading of the regulation, not legal advice. It is based on:

Talk about your CRA file

Tell me which microcontroller your product uses and when it ships. I'll tell you which of these clauses Groundplane covers for it, and which stay with you.